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The Facebook Frontier:
Responding to the Changing Face of
Privacy on the Internet
SamanthaL. Millier'
INTRODUCTION

long after Amy Polumbo was crowned Miss New Jersey in June
of 2007, she was allegedly blackmailed using photos found on her
Facebook profile.' Through a highly publicized confrontation with her
blackmailer, Polumbo told NBC's Today show that the pictures were "meant
to be private," that they were "supposed to be between my friends and I
[sic]." 3 Luckily, the pageant board decided that although the photos were
in "poor taste," they did not feature nudity and were not serious enough to
4
strip Polumbo of her crown.
The Polumbo incident epitomizes the first-person problem of online
social networks. Presumably, these pictures were taken with Polumbo's
knowledge, much like many of the pictures users place on their Facebook
profiles. Either one of Polumbo's friends or a third party acquired the
pictures and decided to blackmail her. This sort of problem is the type of
privacy invasion online social network users face on a daily basis. Many
users fail to realize the import of their decisions to pose for a picture or post
personal information on their online profiles.
In the digital world of online social networks, users have grown
accustomed to the free flow of information and expansive opportunities for
self-expression. One of the most popular networks, Facebook, began as
a networking tool on Harvard University's campus.5 The site was created
by Mark Zuckerberg, and was originally intended to serve as the online
version of Harvard's paper publication of pictures and information about
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i B.A. from Colgate University, 2oo6; J.D. expected from University of Kentucky College
of Law, 2oo9. The author would like to thank Professor Mark Kightlinger for his comments on
and guidance with earlier drafts of this Note. All errors and omissions are the author's alone.
2 Wayne Parry, 'Private' Online Photos Really Aren't, SFGATE, July i2, 2007, http://www.
sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=ln/a/2007/07/I 2/national/a 135131 D 1I.DTL&tsp= I.

3 Id.
4 Id.
5 John Cassidy, ME Media: How Hanging Out on the Internet Became Big Business, NEW
YORKER, May 15, 2006, at 50, available at http://www.newyorker.com/archive/zoo6/o5/15/
o6055 fa-fact-cassidy?currentPage= i.
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enrolling freshman. 6 The site quickly caught on at Harvard and rapidly
expanded to other college campuses. In the fall of 2006, Facebook opened
to the public, and the privacy risks posed to users skyrocketed.'
From its inception, Facebook has appealed to "a powerful yearning:
the desire of hundreds of ambitious and impressionable young people to
establish themselves and make friends in an unfamiliar environment."9
Working in tandem with this social desire, users have a sense of privacy
in the information they post because their profiles are associated with
particular social groups, like one's university, high school, or town, and only
users in that social group may see members' profiles. This sense of privacy
and familiarity encourages users to post personal information, pictures,
and update their "status" to let friends know exactly what they are doing
on a daily basis.'" Though users have the means to limit public access to
their profiles, some do not to realize they have this option or fail to activate
available privacy restrictions." Additionally, users frequently do not account
for unknown third parties that have access to this information. Many users
also fail to understand the "data mining" of personal information that is
from the network itself
conducted by the private sector with permission
2
and, unknown to them, with the users' consent.'
Consider the example ofFreddi Staur, a toy frog with a Facebook account.
In a recent study conducted by Sophos, a Boston-based Internet security
company, Freddi "friended" 200 Facebook members. 3 Of the 200, 82
accepted the frog's friendship request, and Freddi was thereby able to view
these Facebook members' personal information. 4 Sophos' "research shows
that 41% of Facebook users will divulge personal information-such as email, address, date of birth and phone number-to a complete stranger."'
Additionally, strangers were, in most cases, given access to family photos,
intimate details about one's likes and dislikes, hobbies, employer details,
6 Id. at 50-52.
7 Id. at 52.
8 MichaelArrington, Facebook Just Launched Open Registrations, TechCrunch (Sept. 26,
2oo6), http://www.techcrunch.cOm/2oo6/o91z6/facebook-just-launched-open-registrations/.
9 Cassidy,supra note 5, at 52.
io Id.
ii Carly Brandenburg, Note, The Newest Way to Screen Job Applicants: A Social Networer's
Nightmare,60 FED. COMM. L.J. 597,602 (2008).
12 Annie Schleicher, NewsHour Extra: Facebook, MySpace Launch New Targeted Ads,
PBS Online NewsHour (Nov. 7, 2007), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/extra/features/julydeco7/social_ I-07.pdf.
13 Mint.Com, HOWTO: Protect your Privacy on Facebook, MySpace, and Linkedln
(Sept. 6, 2007), http://blog.mint.com/blog/moneyhack/howto-protect-your-privacy-onfacebook-myspace-and-linkedin/.
14 Id.
15 Sophos, Facebook: The Privacy and Productivity Challenge, http://www.sophos.com/
security/topic/facebook.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2008).
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and other personal information. 6 The Sophos experiment illustrates the
precarious nature of first-person problem: the desire to share information
with one's friends may also expose users to unknown third parties who may
misuse their information.
The fundamental problem with online social networks is the
dichotomous demands of users: "People want access to all the information
around them, but they also want complete control over their own
information."' 7 People's expectations of privacy are transforming, and as
social networks like Facebook scramble to react to these changes, privacy
law in the United States has been at a relative standstill. As the Internet
and social networking sites continue to expand and become more integral
to modern life, state legislatures have recognized the problem and have
begun to take action.' 8 These efforts are important progress in the right
direction; however, given the global nature of the problem, it is important
that the federal government take action.
This Note will address the changing conception of privacy on the
Internet through an analysis of the online social networking site, Facebook.
The purpose of this Note is to advocate a more modern conception of
privacy and to argue for more thorough federal and state action to protect
privacy online. Part I of this Note will discuss how online social networks
function and the various risks associated with their use. Part II will analyze
what privacy means within the context of the first-person problem and
will discuss exactly what is sought to be protected. It will also introduce a
modern conception of privacy: information privacy. Part III will consider
current legislation regulating online social networks, including the
Communications Decency Act, and will discuss the accesibilty of traditional
forms of common law protection against the misuse of personal information.
This section will discuss how U.S. laws and regulations may help to deter
harmful activity and encourage more responsibilty on the part of online
social network administrators. Part IV will consider the European Union's
model of Internet privacy and compare it to the relative hands-off, selfregulatory approach taken by the U. S. government. Part V will discuss new
legal constructs to protect against misuse of private information and will
analyze the efficacy of current self-regulatory state action to protect social
networks' users online. Finally, this Note will advocate for more protective,
federal action, similar to the European Data-Protection Supervisor.

16 Id.
17 Cassidy, supra note 5,at 54 (quoting Mark Zuckerberg).
18 See infra notes 145-56 and accompanying text.
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I. How ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORKS WORK
AND THE RISKS THEY PRESENT

As of August 26, 2008, 100 million users have registered on Facebook. 19
Creating an account is easy: go to www.facebook.com, enter your full
name, birth date, e-mail, and register your password. Facebook will send a
confirmation link to your registered e-mail, which you click on to complete
registration. Once you have registered, Facebook presents you with
what is essentially a template into which you may enter any information
you choose. There is a place to upload an identifying picture and other
personal or identifying information. Users may enter their relationship
status; high schools, universities, and graduate schools attended; favorite
music, movies, and books; hometown, current town, e-mail addresses, and
home addresses.
Members may then start adding "friends" on the network, usually
people one knows from the non-digital world, who must confirm your
friendship before being granted corresponding access to the other person's
profile. Members may control who views their personal information: they
may make it available system-wide without discretion, or they may limit
access to just their friends. Members may create photo albums, much like
Web sites such as flickr.com or kodakgallery.com, and "tag," or identify by
name, friends in their pictures: "[w]ith just a few clicks, a user can post
a picture of a group of friends at a party, say, and 'tag' the image with
their names for others to see." 0 By "tagging" a photo, Facebook creates
a link the individual's profile from the photograph, making users easily
identifiable, even when the viewer of the photograph is not "friends" with
the photograph's subjects. "If a Facebook member in the picture objects,
he can remove the link to his profile, but he can't get the picture taken
down."",
Though most harm to users is generated by their own actions
(communication with strangers, posting too much personal information, or
allowing indiscriminate access to one's profile), there are serious problems
caused by the actions of second and third parties. In a recent e-mail to
Mark Zuckerberg's roommate, one user explains a common problem:
By launching the photo feature and creating the system of easy linkages
and tagging, you guys have dramatically changed social interactions ....
Some people envision an upcoming era of "no camera" policies at parties
and a growing sense of paranoia among college students worried that all
their actions on Friday night appear online just hours later, accessible to
hundreds or thousands of users (e.g., I can see Betty getting wasted at the
19 Posting of Mark Zuckerberg to The Facebook Blog, http://blog.facebook.com/blog.
php?blog-id=company&m=8&y=2oo8 (Aug. 26, 2008, 3:2 1 EST).
20 Cassidy, supra note 5, at 58.
21 Id.
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[bar] even if I can't access Betty's profile). A single user with low privacy
restrictions "overcomes/ruins" all the protective and restrictive steps taken
by peers."2
The problem doesn't end here, though. Facebook is well known to
employers, and the network is commonly used to conduct "background
checks" on potential new hires.2 3 This type of screening only exacerbates
privacy concerns. Though users may have control over who may view their
personal profiles, second and third parties are free to post information or
images at their discretion.
One of the latest networks to spark controversy is JuicyCampus.com,
which epitomizes the third-party problem posed by online social networks.
As of October 6, 2008, the site offers services to 500 campuses with the
plans to expand further.2 4 Students may anonymously post comments
about any topic, and the Web site assures its visitors that posts are 100%
anonymous. The Web site also provides a search engine, so visitors may
search for specific names without the hassle of perusing the entire site.
The site explains on its FAQ page that the operators will not remove posts
unless a court finds the post criminal, and claims immunity for everything
posted on the site pursuant to section 230 of the Communications Decency
5
Act.1
Posts on JuicyCampus.com range from innocuous to devastating.
Students report anything from others' sexual exploits and other embarrassing
information to simply discussing their favorite teachers or favorite bars on
campus. Common discussion topics may include "the sluttiest girls" on
campus or the "biggest cocaine users" on campus.2 6 Though students'
reactions to the site are mixed, there is a general consensus among college
administrations and student leaders that the site needs to be banned or
terminated.27 For the time being, individuals remain free to anonymously
spread rumors or reveal personal information about others.
Unauthorized *exposure to third parties takes a different form on
Facebook, where users may believe that they have control over personal
information posted strictly on their personal profile, but this is not the case.

22

Id.

23 Brandenburg,supra note i i, at 598.

24 Posting of JuicyCampus to Official JuicyCampus Blog, http://juicycampus.blogspot.
com/2oo8/Io/5o-campuses.html (Oct. 6, 2008, 1I:I2EST). As of February 5, 2009,
JuicyCampus.com has closed. The author chose to keep this discussion to emphasize the
recurring issues present on blogs and social networks.
25 JuicyCampus.com, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.juicycampus.com/posts/
faq (last visited Nov. 2, 2008); see infra Part III A and B.
26 David L.Hudson, Jr., Taming the Gossipmongers: Websites That Dish Dirt May Soon Get
Their Publishers'Hands Muddy, ABA J., July zoo8, at i9, 19.
27 MSNBC.com, Backlash Targets JuicyCampus.com: Students Protest Anonymous,
Salacious Posts (Feb. 17, 2oo8), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/2321 151 I/.
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One of the more controversial examples of this lack of control is Facebook's
targeted advertising based on users' listed interests and activities on the
Internet (both on and off Facebook). 5 This type of "behavior advertising"
is part of a larger advertising scheme utilized by the private sector that
tracks Internet searches through cookies and collecting other relevant
personal data used in determining what ads will pop-up while a specific
user browses the Internet. Facebook utilizes a similar program and offers
advertisers access to users' personal information listed on their Facebook
profiles, much to the ignorance of Facebook users who post that content
for social purposes. Users have consented to this data mining, however,
usually-by offhandedly clicking "I accept" to a release as a condition to
adding certain third party programs to their profiles. z9
In 2007, several mergers and acquisitions between online media
advertisers sparked controversy in the United States and Europe and
amplified the behavioral advertising issue. The Google-DoubleClick
merger may be the most significant, and it was investigated by the Federal
Trade Commission and the European Commission. 30 Of primary concern
was the potential for the merged companies to amass and control a large
amount of personal data.3 Google collects "users' search history and Internet
preferences, while DoubleClick is a leader in aggregating information
on Internet preferences. '3 The main fear is that "Google's extensive
library of user information coupled with DoubleClick's business model of
consumer profiling could enable them to build extremely intimate portraits
of individuals and unfairly exploit such information. 3 3 There is no current
legislation regarding online advertising, and self-regulatory measures have
proved ineffective according to the Electronic Privacy Information Group,
a non-profit privacy activist group. 4
In May 2008, the Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic
filed a complaint with the Privacy Commissioner of Canada against
Facebook, alleging that the site failed to inform members "how their
personal information is disclosed to third parties for advertising and other
profit-making activities and its failure to obtain permission from Facebook
members to such uses and disclosures of their personal information."3

28 Schleicher, supranote 12.
29

Id.

30 Jacqueline Klosek et al., InternationalLegal Developments in Review: 200 7 Industries, 42
INT'L LAW. 621,622 (2OO8).
31 Id.

32 Id.

33 Id. at 622-23.
34 Id. at 623.
35 News Release, Canadian International Public Interest Clinic, CIPPIC Files Privacy
Complaint Against Facebook (May 30, 2oo8), http://www.cippic.ca/uploads/NewsRelease3oMayo8.pdf.
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The complainant alleged that Facebook users are in the dark about the
extent to which their personal data is being shared with advertisers and
36
are being deceived about the level of privacy that exists on the site.
Specifically, users are confronted with form agreements to release all
personal information to third parties, and users consent in order to have full
access to utilities on the site.37 Further, users are unaware of the extent to
which their "friends"' privacy settings affect their personal privacy on the
site. 38 The complaint alleged that such behavior is deceptive and in strict
violation of the Canadian Personal Information Protection and Electronic
Documents Act, of which the United States has no equivalent.39
The first-person problem of privacy on online social networks is
clear. Users are not well informed concerning the risks posed when an
individual posts information on the site. In fact, the site has successfully
encouraged users to believe their personal data is private and under their
individual control. Conversely, the ability of second parties to post personal
information under lower privacy settings and for third parties to "mine"
and misuse this personal information (originating from both the first person
and second person) has the potential to seriously affect the lives of those
involved, as well as any sense of security on the Internet. Yet, most users
are ignorant of the extent to which their personal information is being used
and disseminated throughout the Internet. In this digital world, questions
remain as to exactly what is private on online social networks, what is worth
protecting, and how personal information can be effectively protected.
II. WHAT IS PRIVATE?

A. Definition of Privacy on the Internet
Duncan Watts, a sociologist at Columbia University, has offered an
explanation for the exponential popularity of Facebook among its eighteen
to twenty-four year old, relatively better educated, and higher income
demographic.10 Watts claims "the growth of sites like Facebook and
MySpace reflects a dramatic shift in how young people view the Internet."'"
After nearly a decade of study, Watts believes that the popularity of Web
sites like Facebook "doesn't have anything to do with networking at all.
It's voyeurism and exhibitionism. People like to express themselves, and
they are curious about other people."4 But proponents of the site paint a
36
37
38
39
40

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Cassidy, supranote 5, at 55; see Schleicher, supra note 12.
41 Cassidy, supranote 5 at 55.
42 Id.
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different picture. They claim that the positive aspects of free speech, self
expression, networking, and business opportunities are immense on these
sites, and these positive aspects outweigh the dangers, particularly for smart
users.43 In order for all users to benefit from these sites, it is important that
they are protected from unseen dangers and privacy violations.
There are infinite articulations of what "privacy" means. Scholars differ
on what attributes of privacy deserve focus. Scholarly definitions range in
emphasis on personal autonomy, control over private information, or simple
data protection. 44 Despite their differing definitions of privacy, scholars'
"proffered justifications for protecting privacy include allowing individuals
to define themselves and the information they want to share with others
in the formation of relationships ... that privacy provides for emotional
release, invites self-evaluation, facilitates decision-making, and promotes
physical and psychological autonomy. '4 One persuasive articulation of
privacy is "information privacy," which offers insight into what should be
protected online and why.
B. InformationPrivacy
Upon the advent of privacy law theory, wide-scale public
communication was limited to print sources, such as newspapers and
books.' With the emergence of radio and television in the early and
mid-1900's, public communication became more direct and invasive
to the family home. However, these methods of communication were
regulated by the government, and private individuals rarely had access
to such communication.47 In distinct contrast to these earlier forms of
communication, the Internet offers instantaneous access to hundreds
of millions of users from inside their homes. The content and available
information on the Internet is largely unregulated, and though an individual
user may not necessarily have a powerful voice on the Internet, the potential

43 Tal Z. Zarsky, Law and Online Social Networks: Mapping the Challenges and Promises of

User-GeneratedInformation Flows, I8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 741, 742-43,
748-52 (zoo8); Amy Dvorak, Linkedln? No, But I'll Try, LEGAL MGMT., July/Aug. 2oo8,at 88.
44 Scott Rempell, Privacy, PersonalData and Subject Access Rights in the European Data
Directive and Implementing UK Statute: Durantv. FinancialServices Authority as a Paradigmof
Data Protection Nuances and Emerging Dilemmas, I8 FLA. J. INT'L L. 807, 81-812 (2006). An
in-depth analysis of the meaning of privacy is beyond the scope of this Note; however, the
author advocates that control over information is the most relevant articulation of privacy when
discussing the "first-party problem" of online social networks. For an in depth discussion of
privacy, see Ruth Gavison, Privacy andthe Limits of Law, 89 YALE. L. J. 421 (i98o).
45 Rempell, supra note 44,at 812.
46 Andrew J. McClurg, Kiss andTell: ProtectingIntimate RelationshipPrivacy Through Implied
Contracts of Confidentiality, 74 U. CIN. L. REv. 887, 889 (2oo6).
47 Id. at 889.
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to reach millions is still there. This power presents unprecedented
vulnerabilities to the privacy and safety of individuals.
Information privacy is "usually defined as the right of individuals to
control information about themselves."48 The concept of information
privacy finds its basis primarily in "tort law of privacy, state and federal
privacy legislation and the constitutional protections guaranteed by the
First and Fourth Amendments."49 Information privacy scholars, despite
their many doctrinal disagreements, hold two common arguments and
assumptions. First, there is a "binary distinction between 'decisional
privacy' and 'information privacy."'' 0 Second, these scholars tend "to
approach the problems of privacy from a technological or intellectual
property background, and have been interested in the technical aspects
of information regulation in addition to its jurisprudential implications." 1
Finding examples of both decisional and informational privacy in the
2
holdings of seminal Supreme Court privacy cases, Griswoldv. Connecticut,"
Roe v. Wade, 3 and Lawrence v.Texas,54 for example, scholars seem to lack
coherency as to the definition of informational privacy.5 It appears these
scholars have extrapolated informational privacy from the guarantees of
the First Amendment as interpreted in the Supreme Court's recent privacy
holdings that identified a "zone of privacy."56
A preeminent information privacy scholar, Daniel Solove, has contributed
extensively to the study and the development of privacy in the context of
the Internet and social networking sites. Solove's academic focus is on the
inadequacy of privacy law to address current problems presented by the
Internet and advocates the "abandon[ment] of the binary view of privacy,
which is based on the archaic notion that if you're public, you have no
claim to privacy."57 Solove advocates that privacy law should recognize an
individual's social expectations of confidentiality and enforce duties upon
others to that effect.58 Solove has also opined that the modern explosion of
Internet use and the consequential lack of control over personal information
has in effect turned the Google search into "a digital scarlet letter." 9 Solove
48 Neil M. Richards, The Information Privacy Law Project,94 GEO. L.J. IO87, 1089 (2006).
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,485 (1965).
53 Roe v. Wade, 41o U.S. 113,152-53 (1973).
54 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,578 (2003).
55 Richards, supra note 48, at I Io6-i I.
56 Id. atIl II;Griswold 38 1 U.S. at 485.
57 DANIEL

J.

SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: Gossip, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE

INTERNET 190 (2007).

58 Id.at191.
59 Benjamin E Heidlage, Limiting the ScarletA: Daniel Solove's the Futureof Reputation, 83
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has proposed several solutions to the problem, including an expansion of
privacy torts and expansion of "defamation liability to bloggers who fail to
remove defamatory third-party comments ' 60 as well as alternative dispute
resolution for users to resolve privacy violations. 61 As discussed infra, these
suggested solutions are certainly options, but recent case law interpreting
existing federal law may be a better option. 6 1 In any case, the United States
has yet to recognize information privacy in a manner that might allow for
the expansion of privacy torts, but recent case law suggests the Supreme
Court might be ready to make such a logical leap.
In Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court invigorated the right to
privacy.63 When officers responded to a complaint and encountered two
men engaged in homosexual sodomy, the men were arrested for violating a
Texas state law that made homosexual sodomy illegal. 64 In striking down
the Texas law as violative of the Due Process Clause, the Court based its
holding on privacy grounds. 6 The Court identified two aspects of the
constitutionally protected liberty interests: "spatial" and "transcendent"
dimensions that guarantee freedom of one's person as well as freedom of
thought, belief, expression, and intimate conduct. 66 The Supreme Court
history,
also based its holding on the realm of privacy found in precedent,
67
and, most importantly, an "emerging awareness" in our culture.
This Lawrence holding suggests an emboldened view of privacy
by the Supreme Court, one that may be relevant for Internet privacy
jurisprudence. The holding may leave open the possibility of judicial
recognition of a constitutionally protected right of information privacy on
online social networks based on the transcendent dimensions of privacy.
If the government is held to a standard whereby they may not intrude
upon a person's right to privacy in the bedroom or right to expression and
belief, then why should private actors be held to a different standard? The
threat is the same, the privacy interest violated is the same, and the risk
of violation is even higher by virtue of the expansive exposure of personal
information on the Internet.

N.Y.U. L. REv. 982,983 (zoo8) (citing SOLOVE, supra note 57, at 94).
60 Id. at 986.
61 SOLOVE, supranote 57, at 191-92.
62 See infra Part III.
63 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
64 Id. at 563.
65 Id.at 578.
66 Id. at 562.

67 Id. at 572.
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C. The Unauthorized Viewer andMaliious ThirdParties

There is little case law in the area of Internet privacy and the issues
encountered on online social networks. As many of the safety and
obscenity issues caused by these sites are beyond the scope of this Note,
the remainder of the discussion will focus on the first-person problem of
posted information that is misused or disseminated to unintended viewers
and legal recourse for users whose privacy is compromised. Though case law
suggests that individuals have a right to privacy where their expectations of
privacy are reasonable, the status of legal remedies does not comport with
the problem of the unauthorized viewer or a malicious second party.
As a general matter, courts have traditionally found that by placing
information about oneself on a public forum like the Internet, the claim to a
reasonable expectation of privacy is lost. Take, for example, United States v.
Gines-Perez,where the court specifically addressed the issue of privacy and
the Internet.' In Gines-Perez, the defendant was arrested on drug charges
when his vehicle was stopped and searched by police, at which time drugs
and drug paraphernalia were discovered.69 The defendant was recognized
by officers as a result of a photograph the officers had viewed previously
on the Internet, allegedly downloaded from a private Internet site.70 The
defendant claimed he had an expectation of privacy in the site, and that
access to the photograph constituted an illegal search and seizure."
The court directly addressed the issue of constitutional privacy
on the Internet, though they recognized there was "no clear guidance
... available in case law."7" Nonetheless, in the context of state action
and the heightened privacy protection associated therewith, the court
acknowledged that the applicable test is one of constitutional privacy.73
Thus, the relevant inquiry is first "whether a person has exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy; and second, whether the expectation
4
of privacy is one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable. ' M"1
The court stated that it was convinced that "placing information on the
information superhighway necessarily makes said matter accessible to the
public, no matter how many protectionist measures may be taken."" The
court continued that it is "obvious that a claim to privacy is unavailable to

68 United States v. Gines-Perez,

214 F Supp. 2d 205, 224-26

69 Id.
70

Id.at

212-13

71 Id. at 213.
72 Id. at 225.
73 Id.
74 Id. (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,361 (1967)).
75 Id.

(D.P.R 2002).
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someone who places information on an indisputably, public medium, such
as the Internet, without taking any measure to protect the information."76
Within the context of privacy invasion conducted by private parties, the
test for whether a privacy interest exists is largely the same. One recent case
applies this test and may offer a useful analogy to the unauthorized thirdparty viewer problem on online social networks. In Sanders v. American
BroadcastingCompanies, Sanders brought an action for the tortious invasion
of privacy by intrusion against a fellow employee who secretly taped
conversations between the two for media production. 77 The court held
that the tort may lie where a "'defendant penetrated some zone of physical
or sensory privacy surrounding, or obtained unwanted access to data about,
the plaintiff ... if the plaintiff had an objectively reasonable expectation
of seclusion or solitude in the place, conversation or data source."' 78 The
court held that even though the conversation in question could have been
overheard by other employees (but not the general public) making the
plaintiff's expectation of privacy incomplete, the plaintiff may still have a
cause of action for invasion of privacy.79
The Sanders holding was partially based on the common law concept of
workplace privacy and that the recording was intended for media production.
However, this result may be extrapolated to the first-person problem of
online social networks. The court stated that "the reasonableness of a
person's expectation of visual and aural privacy depends not only on who
might have been able to observe the subject interaction, but on the identity
of the claimed intruder and the means of intrusion."8 Thus, in situations
where a person may not have a reasonable expectation in, perhaps, intimate
or lewd behavior at a party, they most likely do not expect a picture of the
party to be posted on the Internet or the details of an intimate encounter
described on JuicyCampus.com. Within the confines of that party, one
expects that their behavior may be observed and repeated within their
social circle, similar to the workplace environment. One may not, however,
reasonably expect their behavior to be widely reported and recounted on
an online social network so that the information is accessible to a large
number of unknown users.

76 Id.
77 Sanders v. American Broadcasting Company, 978 P.2d 67, 70 (Cal. 1999). California
adopted the tort of intrusion in Shulman v. Group W Productions,Inc., 955 Pad 469, 490 (Cal.
1998). The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 65zB (1977), as articulated in Shulman,
describes the tort as follows: "(1) intrusion into a private place, conversation or matter, (2) in a
manner highly offensive to a reasonable person." Id.
78 Sanders, 978 P.ad at 71 (citing Shulman v. Group W. Productions, Inc., 955 Pad 469,
490 (Cal. 1998)).
79 Id. at 77.
8o Id.
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Though this type of privacy invasion is not on the same scale as a media
production, there is still harm caused to the individual's privacy interest.
It may be that the harm caused by dissemination to one's campus or circle
of friends is equally devastating to the individual, and dissemination
to the general public has only a slight incremental effect on the overall
harm caused. In these situations, one should be able to claim a right to
privacy in that information and bring a corresponding action in tort for the
violation. The case may be, however, that the party disseminating the
harmful information cannot be found.8 In such cases it is paramount that
the individual have an alternative course of action: either in the form of a
cause of action against the service provider, or some sort of expost remedy.
III. CURRENT LAW

A. The CommunicationsDecency Act. An Act of Unintended Consequences
The Communications Decency Act (CDA), enacted in 1996, provides
that "[nlo provider or user of an interactive computer device shall be
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider.""2 The Act preempts civil liability for "'Good
Samaritan' blocking and screening of offensive material" by the service
provider.83 Additionally, the Act states that "[n]othing in this section shall
be construed to prevent any State from enforcing any State law that is
consistent with this section [and] no liability may be imposed under any
State or local law that is inconsistent with this section." ' The scope of
immunity provided by the Act has consistently been interpreted broadly:
courts have not imposed any affirmative screening duties on network
providers, and have consistently protected providers from liability where
third party system users publish defamatory or other harmful information.
In the seminal case Zeran v. America Online, Inc., the Fourth Circuit
interpreted the scope of immunity provided by the CDA, an interpretation
courts have followed for many years.85 In this case, Zeran was presumably
the object of a prank whereby an anonymous person posted Zeran's home
telephone number on an Internet bulletin as the number to call in order to
purchase offensive t-shirts regarding the Oklahoma City bombing. 6 Zeran
received harassing telephone calls and complained to AOL to remove the
post and issue a retraction; AOL removed the first post, but would not issue
8I See Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 E3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003) (describing where an anonymous
distributor of clandestine locker room videos could not be found).
82 Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(I) (2000).
83 47 U.S.C. § 230(c).
84 47 U.S.C. § 23o(e)(3).
85 Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
86 Id. at 329.
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a retraction.87 Subsequently, the anonymous person posted multiple new
bulletins for offensive t-shirts and other memorabilia with Zeran's number
attached.88 Zeran then brought an action against AOL alleging that the
service "unreasonably delayed in removing defamatory messages posted
by an unidentified third party, refused to post retractions of those messages,
89
and failed to screen for similar postings thereafter."
The Zeran court held that section 230 of the CDA, by its plain language,
"creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that would make
service providers liable for information originating with a third-party user
of the service." 9 The court explained that "lawsuits seeking to hold a
service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher's traditional editorial
functions-such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter
content-are barred." 91 The court reasoned that section 230 was enacted in
order to remove the "specter of liability" involved when a provider filters
information posted by users, presumably qualifying providers as publishers
92
of defamatory information that is not caught by filtering activities. The
court affirmed summary judgment in favor of AOL, citing the impracticality
of requiring service providers to screen all posts, the "chilling effect"
screening would have on users' First Amendment rights, and AOL's role as
93
a provider entitled to immunity under section 230.
Despite the policy objectives advocated by the Zeran court, the CDA
also states that the policy promulgated under the Act is "to promote the
continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer
services."' Additionally, the Act is intended to "preserve the vibrant and
competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet," and also
to "encourage the development of the technologies which maximize user
control over what information is received by individuals ... who use the
Internet."95 Paradoxically, the CDA has been consistently used as a shield
from liability for service and network providers rather than an impetus
to increase individuals' control over their personal information that is
disseminated over the Internet, and it offers little protection to users, either
in the form of deterrence or expost remedies.

87 Id.

88 Id.
89 Id. at 3z8.
90 Id. at 330.
91 Id.
92 Id.at 331.
93 Id.at 333.
94 Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (b)(i) (2000).
95 47 U.S.C. § 230 (b)(2)-(3).
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B. Reinterpretationof the CommunicationsDecency Act
Two recent federal court of appeals opinions suggest that the ZeranCourt
and its progeny have misinterpreted the CDA, which was actually intended
to provide more protection to Internet users. 96 In ChicagoLawyers' Committee
v. Craigslist, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's holding
denying liability under section 230 of the CDA. 97 In rendering its opinion,
however, both courts declined to follow the expansive Zeran approach to
section 230 interpretation. Instead, the Seventh Circuit explained that
the Zeran holding "makes [Internet service providers] indifferent to the
content of information they host or transmit." 98 The court noted that the
word immunity is absent from the Act itself and nothing in the legislative
history suggests the Act was meant to provide such broad immunity. 99 The
court held that section 230 has a more narrow scope and only bars actions
in which an Internet service provider would be treated as the publisher of
third party content. 100 This means that actions like traditional defamation
cannot lie under section 230, but the Act does not preclude other actions
that do not treat the provider as a publisher.
More recently, in Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.com, the Ninth
Circuit declined to apply section 230 immunity to a Web site that provided
a roommate-matching service. 10 The Web site required users to register
and create profiles by answering a series of questions regarding personal
attributes and roommate preferences.1 0 2 The Fair Housing Council brought
an action against Roommates.com alleging that the Web site's actions
allowed discriminatory postings in violation of the Fair Housing Act. 103
The court held that the Web site had effectively become a "content
provider" because "every... page is a collaborative effort between Roommate
and the subscriber."'04 Thus, section 230 immunity was not available to the
Web site. Though the court confirmed the ruling in Craigslistbecause that
Web site in no way contributed to the development of illegal content, the
court also stated that "[r]equiring website owners to refrain from taking
affirmative acts that are unlawful [is not] an undue burden."' 15 The court
noted that where a "plaintiff would bring a claim under state or federal law
based on a website operator's passive acquiescence in the misconduct of
96 Hudson, supra note

26, at 19-zo.
97 Chicago Lawyers' Comm. v. Craigslist, 519 E3d 666,671(7th Cir. 2oo8).
98 Id.at 670.
99 Id.at 671 (citing Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003)).
1oo Id.
1i
Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, 521 F3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2oo8).
102

1o3

Id. at 1161-62.
Id. at 1162.

1o4 Id. at 1165, 1167.

105 Id.ati 169 n.24.

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

1Vol. 97

users, the website operator would likely be entitled to CDA immunity.'M
In response to the dissent's First Amendment concerns, the court stated
that "[tihe [I]nternet is no longer a fragile new means of communication
in the cradle by overzealous enforcement of
that could easily be smothered
10 7
laws and regulations."
The Roommates.com decision is important because it clearly redefines
and limits the scope of immunity provided by section 230 of the CDA.
The court opens the door to the possibility that immunity might be denied
in situations where the Web site operator is found to be partly responsible
for the posted content. 0 The nature of Roommates.com is integral to
the holding, however, because the Web site "'was structured in a way that
sought out information that would lead to violations of the law."' °9
This fact is not fatal to the holding's applicability to online social networks.
It may be that sites like JuicyCampus.com and Facebook encourage
unlawful or tortious statements by their design. When one visits a site like
JuicyCampus.com, they are bombarded with requests to post information
about people at their school, proclaiming it is "the place to spill the juice
about all the crazy stuff going on at your campus." 10 JuicyCampus.com
assures visitors that their posts will be "100% anonymous" and even ranks
posts as "most viewed," "most discussed," and "most agreed.""' And on
sites like Facebook, users are presented with a template in which to enter
personal information or any other type of information they like, defamatory
or otherwise."' Not only does the template provided ask for specific types
of information, the social climate on the site serves to promote detailed
disclosure between and among users.
By providing these fields and commands in an environment where
users feel social pressures to participate, these social networking sites may
in fact persuade one to post illegal or tortious content. This argument may
certainly be made, and in that case, the rule articulated in Roommates.com
should apply. Thus, reinterpretation of the CDA might provide a means by
which individuals could enforce their right to privacy, in turn encouraging
online social networks to engage in more active screening or censoring of
tortious or otherwise harmful content.

io6 Id.
107 Id.at l164n.15.
io8 Hudson,supranote 26, at 20.
1o9 Id. (citing SOLOVE,supra note 57,at 94).
visited Oct 13, 2008).
i10 JuicyCampus.com,http://www.juicycampus.com (last
I ii JuicyCampus.com, http://www.juicycampus.comlposts/gossips/all-campuses/
visited Oct. 13, 2008).
1z

See supranotes

19-23

and accompanying text.
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C. Tort Law
Traditionally, tort law has been the means by which one enforces his
right to privacy against private actors." 3 Though tort actions have proven
difficult to apply in the Internet context, causes of action such as false light,
public disclosure, and defamation may translate well into the online social
network context and offer some protection for users as well as a deterrent
effect for misuse of personal information. For example, the Restatement
(Second) of Torts defines the tort for public disclosure as "[o]ne who gives
publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject to
liability to the other for invasion of his privacy if the matter publicized is of
a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is
not of legitimate concern to the public.""' 4 An additional requirement for
tort liability is that the information must be "communicated to the general
public or to enough people so that it is 'substantially certain to become
public knowledge.""' 5 Similarly, false light and defamation require the
information to be false, and published to a third party."6 In the context
of social networks like Facebook, however, vast public dissemination and
false statements are rarely the problem. The problem typically comes
from dissemination of truthful information or pictures within one's social
circle, to data mining advertising agencies, or to unknown third parties, like
employers, who may view the information. Thus, applicability of false light
and defamation torts in the Internet context is seldom recognized.
Nevertheless, tort law may offer potential remedies for the purposes
of online social network privacy. It might be possible to prove "public
knowledge" in a more limited sense to include the "public" present on
the particular online social network. This is suspect, however, because
access is limited for the most part to those users who are "friends" with one
another." 7 It may be argued that most of the damage created by disclosure
of personal information is the damage caused within one's existing social
circle, thus a re-definition of public dissemination may be appropriate.
Alternatively, defamation and false light may prove to be applicable in
situations where a third party has posted false information about another.
This type of expost protection may have a deterrent effect upon individuals
using sites like JuicyCampus.com and Facebook from disseminating false
113 See Scott Jon Shagin, The ProsserPrivacy Torts in a DigitalAge, N.J. LAW., Apr. 2008,
at 9.
§ 652D (1977).
i 15 David V. Richards, Note, Posting Personal Information on the Internet: A Case for
Changingthe Legal Regime Createdby § 23o of the Communications Decency Act, 85 TEX. L. REV.
1321, 1331 (2007) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §65zD, cmt. a (1977)).
116 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977); Shagin, supra note 113, at 11-12.
117 Users must approve and verify that a person is a "friend" before they have
corresponding access to each other's profiles. Seesupra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
I14 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
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information. The question still remains what can be done about the harmful
dissemination of accurate personal information.
IV.

THE EUROPEAN MODEL

The European Union (EU) has made a collective attempt to resolve
these issues with the 1995 passage of the Data Protection Directive' in
an effort to provide broad protection to individuals against "nonconsensual
uses of personal data."" 9 The Directive is based on the idea that "privacy
is a fundamental human right,"'' 0 and has eight basic principles that
The
limit the scope of personal data collection and dissemination.'
Directive provides that personal data may only be collected for "explicit
and legitimate purposes ....[and] collections of data [may] be maintained
only to the degree that they are relevant to the purpose for which they
were collected, and that data be maintained in an accurate and ... up-todate form."'2 2 The Directive provides further protection by reflecting "an
'opt-in' system, under which each individual must provide unambiguous
consent to the collection and use of personal information."'2 3 A data
controller must inform individuals of the purposes for which their personal
data may be used, and individuals must be given "a reasonable opportunity
to access the data and to force the correction or deletion of inaccurate or
inappropriately collected information."'214 In all, the Directive aims to give
individuals extensive control over the use and dissemination of personal
data, and imposes affirmative duties upon those entities that collect and
manage such personal information.'
Although there has been a great deal of criticism concerning the adoption
and implementation of the Directive's policy goals in individual European
Union Member States,2 6 many countries have successfully implemented
such policies, serving as a useful example for the United States. A prime

118 RONALD J. MANN & JANE L. WINN, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 210 (2d ed. 2005) ("[A]
directive is a legislative template that, literally, directed member states to assess their existing
laws on the topic... [imposing a duty on the member state] to enact legislation to bring its
national law into conformity with the substance of the directive.").
ii9 Id.

120 Id.
121 Ryan Moshell, Comment.... And Then There Was One: The OutlookforaSelf-Regulatory
UnitedStates Amidst a Global Trend TowardComprehensiveDataProtection,37 Tx. TECH. L. REV.
357, 368-69 (2005).
122 MANN & WINN, supra note I18,at 211.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 The European concept of privacy is very similar to the expanding concept of
information privacy.
126 Moshell, supra note 12 I,at 370-373.
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example is the United Kingdom's Data Protection Act of 1998.117 The
Act applies broadly to "data processor[s]" and "data controller[s]" who
control personal data about "data subjects."12 8 A "data controller" is a party
that "determines the purposes for which and the manner in which any
personal data ... are processed," and a "data processor" is a third party
that "processes the data on behalf of the data controller."' 29 The "data
subject" is "an individual who is the subject of personal data." 130 The Act
broadly defines "data" as any "information relating to individuals that... is
structured ... in such a way that specific information relating to a particular
individual is readily accessible." 31 The Act operates in conformity with the
EU Directive and provides extensive control to the individual regarding
the processing and correction of personal data. Further, data may not be
transferred to non-EU states, the United States included, that do not
provide an adequate level of protection without enforcing safeguards for
that information (usually in the form of contractual agreements).132
The European concept of data protection is similar to the emerging
concept of information privacy, and in that respect, the European model
may serve as a useful example for future U.S. action. Of particular
importance is the creation in the United Kingdom and the European
Union of independent regulatory bodies that enforce the Directive and
the DPA, respectively. The idea of an independent enforcement body is
compelling. Though the United States has articulated clear policies of
self-regulation,'33 an independent body. that would serve to enforce selfregulations (in conjunction with tort action and other federal regulations
like the CDA) is a persuasive solution to the privacy issues presented by
online social networks. Furthermore, the U.S. government has entered
the private sector to regulate privacy before,' 34 and the need for privacy
regulation on online social networks is equally as great, and will continue
to grow in importance as the Internet continues to proliferate.

Data Protection Act, 1998, c. 29 (Eng.). Similar acts have been adopted in Australia,
& WINN, supra note I 18,at212.
iz8 Data Protection Act, 1998, c. 29, § i(i) (Eng.).; MANN & WINN, supra note 118, at
127

New Zealand, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Israel. MANN
212.

Data Protection Act, 1998, c. 29, § i(i) (Eng.).
130 Id.
131 Id. This definition includes a hybrid from both the "data" and "relevant filing
system" definitions in the Act.
132 Data Protection Act, 1998, c. 29, sched. i (Eng.); MANN & WINN, supra note 118, at
213-16.
133 Moshell, supra note 121, at373-77.
134 Id. at 373-85.
129
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V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

A. ContractualPrivacy
Scholars offer guidance with regard to how legal regimes should adjust
to the increasing concern over privacy invasion on the Internet. One
interesting approach to closing the gap in privacy law is proffered by
Andrew J. McClurg in his article Kiss and Tell: ProtectingIntimate Relationship
Privacy through Implied Contracts of Confidentiality.'35 McClurg notes that
13 6
we have entered into a new era, and genre really, of information privacy.
Information that is traditionally communicated through conversation is
now immediately available in mass communication form.'37 In his article,
McClurg expands on an argument advanced by Professor Eugene Volokh
that "the only constitutionally permissible means for enforcing personal
information privacy is contract law."' 38 Specifically, McClurg argues that
"an implied contract of confidentiality arises in intimate relationships
that the parties will not disseminate through an instrument of mass
communication private, embarrassing information (including photos or
videotapes) about the other acquired during the relationship."' 3 9 A major
shortcoming of this theory is that it offers no protection for people whose
private information is disseminated by third parties with whom they have
little or no prior contact, or simply with whom the relationship does not rise
to the level of "intimate." This approach may prove useful, however, when
seeking remedies for the second-party problem presented by online social
networks.
B. FacialRecognition Software
In situations where information, true or false, is posted by third parties
who do not have any obligation that may arise from a close, confidential
relationship, a pro-active ex post solution might be effective. In a recent
note, In the Face of Danger: FacialRecognition and the Limits of Privacy Law,
the author discusses the privacy implications of the widespread use of facial
recognition software.' 4° Facial recognition software exacerbates the problem
by creating a searchable database of photos of unsuspecting individuals by
matching an individual's name and face through comparison to previously

135 McClurg, supra note 46.

136 Id. at 887.
137 Id.
138 Id.at 888.
139 Id.
14o Note, In the Face of Danger:FacialRecognition andthe Limits of Privacy, 12o HARv. L.
REV. 1870 (2007).
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tagged photos. '41 This type of software sifts through photographs available
to the public on Internet sites and matches faces with registered users;
Polar Rose is one such server that searches all photographs available on the
web. 142 The author recognizes that intimate, spontaneous, and/or impulsive
actions that are out of character have the unique ability to be documented
and disseminated world-wide on the Internet. 43 The note argues that
the databases created by facial recognition software present a precarious
violation of privacy and the author advocates an "opt-out" regime by which
individuals may prevent their names from appearing on these databases."
While the aforementioned note paints a devastating picture of privacy
on the Internet caused by the use of facial recognition software, widespread
use of these search engines may offer much needed protection from the
dissemination of potentially harmful photographs of private individuals.
In situations where compromising photographs of unsuspecting victims
were disseminated on the Internet by third parties to the detriment of
the photograph's subjects-which may result in loss of employment and
social scrutiny-facial recognition software may offer a solution. 4 Instead
of utilizing such software to create privacy violations, sites like Facebook
could be required to offer this software to users as a means to notify users
when pictures (tagged or untagged) of themselves are upoloaded onto the
site. Users could thereby be offered an opportunity to protect against the
dissemination of unwanted personal photographs.
C. Self-Regulation andAnonymous Removal Systems
The positive uses of facial recognition software and the McClurg
formulation have shortcomings. They do not protect the individual from the
harm caused by dissemination of private, written information, or from the
dissemination of photos that may hypothetically fall through the screening
system of facial recognition software because of the angle or blurriness of
the photo. In accordance with U.S. policy in favor of self-regulation, on
September 3, 2008, New Jersey Attorney General Ann Milgram reported
that Facebook would begin testing a program called "Report Abuse,"
designed to be used as a self-help privacy protection tool on the social
networking site.) 6 The purpose of the program is to "provide an easyto-recognize and easy-to-use mechanism to report inappropriate content,

141 Id.
at 1871-73.
142 Id.at 1871-72.
143 Id.
at 1874-75.
144 Id.
at 1873, 1887.
145 Id.
146 Amy E. Bivins, Cybersecurity: Facebook Social Networking Service to Test New Jersey

'ReportAbuse!' ComplaintSystem,

E-COMMERCE LAW DAILY

(BNA), Sept. 4, 2008.
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cyber predators, and online bullies47to social networking website operators
and law enforcement authorities."
The "test-run" for this program will provide a link on randomly
selected Facebook Web pages, and clicking on the prominently placed
icon will allow users to report many types of online abuse as well as
provide users with online safety tips.' 4 The link will not appear on all
pages until after this temporary trial period, when Facebook and state
officials convene to discuss the success of the trial. 49 The "Report Abuse"
system imposes affirmative monitoring duties-unlike the CDA-on an
Internet service provider that agrees to display the icon and utilize the
system. 50 Specifically, "a service must agree to follow certain standards
of service, including reviewing and routing complaints to appropriate law
enforcement agencies."''
Interestingly, the "Report Abuse" program is
already running on several social networking cites, including "myYearbook.
com, BlackPlanet.com, MiGente.com, Glee.com, Faithbase.com, Dweeber.
5
com, and AsianAve.com." M
The inauguration of such self-help technology on online social
networks is part of a larger push for self-regulation to protect children
from online predators.'53 As part of this effort, "Facebook, together with
attorneys general from 48 states and the District of Columbia, announced
May 8, [2008], that the service joined an Internet safety technical task
force formed in January as part of an agreement between the attorneys
general and social networking site MySpace."'' 14 The task force is "led by
Harvard Law School's Berkman Center for Internet & Society," and has
agreed to issue a "formal report with findings and recommendations for
social networking site privacy and child protection self-regulation" by the
end of 2008."' It has been suggested however, that "if those sites do not
comply with the agreement and devise an effective self-regulatory system
for protecting children online, it could create an incentive for lawmakers to
'5 6
push additional legislation."'
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id. This movement has included several legislative efforts, both federal and state,
but few have come to fruition. "Included in these efforts are state bills requiring parental
access to children's online profiles, but "the bills died in Iowa (H.F. 2202) and Florida (H.B.
1029/S.B. 2232), and proposals in New Jersey (A. io8/S.B. 1132) and Illinois (H.B. 4874/S.B.
1682) have yet to move out of committee." Id.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Id.Attorneys have suggested that if an agreement on self regulation is not satisfactory,
legislatures will take immediate action.
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Though much of what this task force is designed to accomplish is beyond
the scope of this Note, it offers hope that change in Internet privacy law
may be afoot. The "Report Abuse" program has important implications for
the future of privacy. A similar program could be implemented whereby
users are able to click on a link entitled "Privacy Violation" to report the
unauthorized dissemination of personal information or unwanted photos.
The link could provide anonymous removal requests be sent to offending
users who would then have the opportunity to chose to remove the material.
If the offending user does not respond to these requests, then an additional
layer of protection could be offered whereby Facebook would have the
power to remove objectively offensive material. s7
CONCLUSION

Privacy as we know it is changing. As the Internet continues to shape
our lives and individuals develop digital personas, privacy should be
conceptualized as control over one's personal information: both substantive
information and behavioral information. In order to better protect an
individual's digital persona, a regime of deterrence and accountability
must be formed to prevent egregious privacy violations. To accomplish
this objective, privacy law should redirect its focus primarily to the online
service provider. The CDA should continue to be interpreted to impose
liability where the service provider contributes to the creation of user
content, as seen in Roommates.com s and Craigslist. 9 The implementation
of self-regulatory systems, like "Report Abuse," that impose affirmative
reporting and monitoring duties when the provider is notified of unlawful
behavior, will create accountability and subsequently decrease online
privacy risks.
As for the risks posed by second and third parties, tort liability and
contractual privacy should be expanded to apply to Internet privacy
violations. Instances of privacy violations should be investigated by an
independent body, either a federal agency or a non-profit privacy rights
advocate group, in order to create an Internet culture that holds people
responsible for tortious behavior. Additionally, expost remedies should be
provided to social network users, such as an anonymous removal request
systems and the positive use of facial recognition software. Facebook
and similar social networking sites should also change their privacy policy
from an opt-out structure, to an opt-in structure in order to ensure users
understand the import of their privacy settings. But most importantly, users
need to become more educated about the use of personal information and
157 Though there are obvious First Amendment concerns with this sort of program,
these issues are beyond the scope of this Note.
158 Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, 521 E3d 1157 (9th Cit. 2oo8).
159 Chicago Lawyers' Comm. v. Craigslist, 519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008).
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the potential for harm on these networks in order to take individual action
to decrease their risks. Though the law of privacy will continue to change
through this digital dialectic, one thing remains clear: privacy law in the
United States can no longer stand still.

